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Abstract
Official film co-production treaties are designed by policymakers to stimulate a range of collaboration and
media flows as determinants of country rankings. China, where , technology transfer, and joint funding
initiatives in the industry. Since July 2004, the Chinese government has used this top-down approach to
cultural diplomacy as a symbolic tool for advancing Chinese cinema and opening the domestic market to a
host of willing international partners. Korean filmmakers in particular have exploited the (often informal)
opportunities presented, engaging in vigorous cooperation between film industry firms and practitioners is
making significant inroads, is one such case, having fallen outside of the Western-dominated global 'Soft
Power 30' index.with Chinese colleagues across all sectors of the production ecosystem. The continuing flow
of Chinese-Korean transnational film encounters, underpinned by influential personal networks, resulted in
the signing of a formal China-Korea co-production agreement in July 2014. To redress this limited
viewpointexamine the efficacy of this policy intervention, this article analyzes a rangethe diversity of film
collaborationscollaboration that preceded the 2014 South Korea-China co-productionthis agreement and
theirits impact on transnational filmmaking in China. It investigates the strategies used in the remaking of
Korean auteur Lee Man Hee's 1966 melodrama Late Autumn (2010), technical innovation in Dexter
Digital'sthe VFX-heavy Mr. Go (2013), and the making of Korean mega-distributor CJ E&M's romance
drama A Wedding Invitation (2013). These recent examples of transnational co-operation prior) to the
signing of this landmark policy instrument illustrate how Korean firms and practitioners are continuing to
expand theexpanding the commercial entertainment boundaries of Chinese cinema, and. In so doing, it also
reveals how Chinese film companies are enabling the Korean film industry to increasingly internationalize its
approach to overseas markets beyond the kind of conspicuous bilateral policy initiatives. This study is
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Official film co-production treaties are designed by policymakers to stimulate a
range of collaborations, technology transfers, and joint funding initiatives in the
10 industry. Since July 2004, the Chinese government has used this top-down
approach to cultural diplomacy as a symbolic tool for advancing Chinese cin-
ema and opening the domestic market to a host of willing international partners.
Korean filmmakers in particular have exploited the (often informal) opportuni-
ties presented, engaging in vigorous cooperation with Chinese colleagues across
15 all sectors of the production ecosystem. The continuing flow of Chinese–Korean
transnational film encounters, underpinned by influential personal networks,
resulted in the signing of a formal China–Korea co-production agreement in
July 2014. To examine the efficacy of this policy intervention, this article ana-
lyzes the diversity of film collaboration that preceded this agreement and its
20 impact on transnational filmmaking in China. It investigates the strategies used
in the remaking of Korean auteur Lee Man Hee’s 1966 melodrama Late Autumn
(2010), technical innovation in the VFX-heavy Mr. Go (2013), and the making
of mega-distributor CJ E&M’s romance drama A Wedding Invitation (2013) to
illustrate how Korean firms and practitioners are expanding the commercial
25 entertainment boundaries of Chinese cinema. In so doing, it also reveals how
Chinese film companies are enabling the Korean film industry to international-
ize its approach to overseas markets beyond the kind of conspicuous policy
initiatives tailored for a globalized cultural economy.
Keywords: People’s Republic of China; South Korea; film policy; co-production;
30 Korean wave
Introduction
Sourcing policy documents and statements published by the People’s Republic of
China’s State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television
(hereafter SAPPRFT, formerly known as SARFT – China’s media regulator) is rela-
35 tively easy today. Yet, despite a wealth of such information, there remains a gulf
between official policy rhetoric and the radical transformation that the film industry
in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) is experiencing on a weekly
basis. This might be considered unsurprising, given the history of the Chinese
Communist Party’s wider approach to cultural policy, discussed in detail elsewhere
40 (Keane 2010, Zhang 2010, Vlassis 2015, and Meyer-Clement 2015). However,
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since the Chinese government’s promulgation of The Administration of Sino-For-
eign Cooperation in the Production of Films Provisions in 2004, and the extension
of the 2003 Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between China and
Hong Kong to the film industry in late 2005, collaboration involving both state-run
5and commercial filmmakers with ties to international colleagues has made the Chi-
nese film industry increasingly competitive on the global stage. In particular, firms
and practitioners working in the Chinese film industry have embraced policy rec-
ommendations arising from the Communist Party’s plenum of October 2011 aimed
at expanding the quantity, quality, and international appeal of the country’s media
10and cultural contents. As a result, Chinese cinema has experienced an exceptional
period of expansion largely as a consequence of a series of unprecedented privati-
zation, professionalization, and internationalization processes that are occurring both
within and beyond Greater China’s borders.
Since the mid-2000s, a host of ‘willing collaborators’ – national and interna-
15tional investors, firms, and creative practitioners, mainly (but not exclusively) from
East Asia – have engaged in various models of collaboration with Chinese compa-
nies. But increasingly over the last five years, they have leapfrogged the older prac-
tices and policies that marked the state-controlled pre-CEPA era, fundamentally
transforming Chinese cinema in dynamic – but uneven – ways. While project-
20based, Hollywood-style contracting-out relationships with producers, aimed at com-
peting on price internationally, have long typified the global film trade (Miller et al.
2005, Goldsmith and O’Regan 2005), this approach to filmmaking has entered
uncharted waters in China. The nerve center of Chinese cinema is being stimulated
in new directions by a number of developments: the rapid expansion of domestic
25multiplex screens (estimated at 32,000 and rising); the proliferation of online
video-on-demand sites (such as Sohu, Youku, Sina, iQiyi, and LeTV) that capture
massive audiences with both foreign and domestic films and television shows; and
Dalian Wanda Group’s acquisition of major exhibition chains in North America
(AMC in 2012) and Australasia (Hoyts in mid-2015), as well as its purchase in
30early 2016 of the production/finance studio Legendary Entertainment (for $3.5 bil-
lion US in cash) – the biggest Chinese acquisition in Hollywood to date.
In addition, the quantity and diversity of domestic films approved by SAPPRFT
continues to proliferate – albeit with due caution. Unprecedented levels of local
Chinese product placement are being seen in Hollywood blockbusters such as Iron
35Man 3 (2013) and Transformers 4 (2014), and top Chinese stars – such as Li
Yifeng – are being recruited as ‘fan ambassadors’ to promote films such as Batman
v Superman: Dawn of Justice (2016) alongside product tie-ins with local dairy,
household goods and fast-food restaurant brands in China. Once unthinkable, a
growing number of new private (including formerly state-owned) practitioners are
40now operating across all sectors of the industry, and Chinese firms continue to
invest in Hollywood companies and vice versa. Even before Dalian Wanda’s
Legendary Entertainment deal in early 2016, it had already begun co-investing in
the US film industry, beginning with the boxing drama Southpaw (2015), starring
Jake Gyllenhaal. Despite these developments, private interests by no means domi-
45nate China’s film scene. The biggest state-owned film studio, the China Film Group
Corporation (hereafter CFG), is also a major player in the new commercial enter-
tainment era. Under its current head, La Peikang (former SARFT deputy chairman
and head of CFG’s China Film Co-Production Company), CFG has invested in the
production of Seventh Son (2014), Pixels (2015), Furious 7 (2015, aka Fast and
2 B. Yecies
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5 Furious 7), and Warcraft (2016). Little wonder that Furious 7 broke all box office
records in China when it was released in April 2015, given CFG’s dominance in
the Chinese market.
Taken in combination, these developments are enabling China to compete on
the global stage, albeit in partly inconspicuous ways and with the valuable assis-
10 tance of one of its most important cultural allies: South Korea (hereafter Korea).
The activities analyzed below reveal their mutual interest in expanding the number
and quality of film co-productions, and China’s desire to engage with a key trading
partner well known for its success in developing vibrant and thriving media and
cultural industries. Yet, while the rhetoric surrounding Korea’s ‘soft power success
15 story’ and its transnational flows across Asia continue to be debated (for e.g. Chua
2012, Iwabuchi 2013, Keane and Liu 2013, Jin and Yoon 2015), the ‘Korean wave’
of contemporary popular culture (television dramas, movies, music, fashion, cos-
metics, tourism and food, etc.) has achieved a dominant position that many coun-
tries envy.1 Chinese practitioners, firms and policymakers have increasingly sought
20 to boost the international appeal of Chinese media and cultural contents by integrat-
ing lessons learned from foreign competitors and collaborators. As a result of their
proven technical capabilities, global experience, availability, affordability and geo-
graphical and cultural proximity, Korean film practitioners and companies have pro-
vided a wealth of opportunities and resources for their Chinese colleagues – well
25 before the 2014 co-production treaty officially invited them to do so.
With this evolving background in mind, I draw on three brief case studies to
reveal how deeply enmeshed Korean and Chinese filmmakers have become
throughout the 2010s (and before) in ways that anticipate and underpin the core
aspirations of the China–Korea co-production agreement signed in July 2014. First,
30 I investigate the strategies used in the remaking of Korean auteur Lee Man Hee’s
1966 melodrama Late Autumn (2010). Second, I analyze the technical innovations
employed in Dexter Digital’s VFX-heavy Mr. Go (2013), illustrating how Dexter –
along with other Korean visual effects and digital intermediary firms like Digital
Studio 2L, Digital Idea, Macrograph, Moneff – have thrived in the new environ-
35 ment to the extent that they have established ongoing representation in China.
Third, and finally, I explore the inconspicuous relationships behind the making of
Korean mega-distributor CJ E&M’s romance drama A Wedding Invitation (2013),
which systematically reclad an original Korean story in Chinese dress. Through
these three case studies, I demonstrate how Korean directors, actors and special
40 effects practitioners are offering their skills to the rapidly expanding Chinese film
industry in return for massively increased exposure and investment opportunities.
Based on these developments – which have arisen in response to pressures from
within a rapidly globalizing industry – this study enquires how the 2014 co-produc-
tion treaty between China and Korea might build on this established foundation of
45 collaboration and further benefit both film industries in concrete ways.
The forging of Chinese–Korean connections
Central to the current frenzy of transnational activity in the Chinese film industry
are contributions by practitioners from Korea who have made a significant impact
on the Asian superpower’s film industry ecosystem. For some time now, Chinese
50 firms have been recruiting established Korean directors, of whom Park Yu-hwan, Jo
Jin-kyu, Kwak Jae-yong, Hur Jin-ho, Ahn Byeong-ki, and Heo In-moo are the best
International Journal of Cultural Policy 3
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known. The results of these collaborations have included the thriller The Mysterious
Family (2016); melodrama Passion Heaven (2016); rom-com Meet Miss Anxiety
(2014); romantic dramas A Good Rain Knows (2009) and Dangerous Liaisons
5(2012) – both with Zonbo Media; Korean horror remake Bunshinsaba (2012, aka
Bi Xian) and its 2013 and 2014 sequels; and the romantic comedy The Wedding
Bible (yet to be released by Beijing East Light Films in 2016), respectively. Sea-
soned Korean cinematographer Kim Hyung-gu – of The Host (2006) and Memories
of Murder (2003) fame – shot Chen Kaige’s Together (2002), while Choi Sang-
10mok was responsible for Ahn’s Bunshinsaba 1 and 2. Producer Edward Yi Chi
Yun, who developed personal networks in China in the early 1990s while attending
the Beijing Film Academy (BFA), has consulted on a number of major films –
Feng Xiaogang’s Assembly (2007) and Aftershock (2010); John Woo’s Red Cliff I
(2008) and Red Cliff II (2009); Tsui Hark’s Flying Swords of Dragon Gate (2011);
15Hu Guan’s The Chef, The Actor, The Scoundrel (2013); Bob Brown and Peng
Chang’s co-directed Korean–Chinese–US action–thriller Urban Games (2014); and
the action–crime–comedy Bad Guys Always Die (2015), co-produced by leading
Chinese and Korean filmmakers Feng Xiaogang and Kang Je-kyu. The personal
networks that producer Yi and his Korean classmates at the BFA cultivated while
20studying in China, and the contacts they have made since, have paved the way for
much of this collaboration.
While the list of Korean actors and actresses appearing in Chinese films over
the past two decades is too long to detail here, lesser known collaborations behind
the camera include a cohort of Korean post-production practitioners who have
25made significant inroads in the rapidly expanding Chinese film industry. For exam-
ple, Seoul-based Digital Idea and Beijing-based Lollol Media both contributed to
the visual effects (hereafter VFX) and digital intermediary (aka DI or color grading)
work for Tsui Hark’s top-performing 3D film Flying Swords of Dragon Gate
(2011), as well as the hits CZ12 (directed by Jackie Chan, 2012) and The Chef,
30The Actor, The Scoundrel. In addition, Korea’s CJ Powercast, Next Visual Studio,
and Lollol Media (along with Chinese firm Phenom Film) all made major contribu-
tions to the VFX and 2D/3D digital intermediary work on director Wuershan’s
supernatural fantasy–action romance Painted Skin 2: The Resurrection (2012).
One of the biggest box office sensations resulting from Chinese–Korean collab-
35oration is Stephen Chow’s fantasy–drama–romance The Mermaid (2016), which as
of April 2016 had returned a gross profit of nearly $526 million US in China alone
and a total worldwide gross box office of $542 million US. For this action-packed
VFX-heavy production, Korean company Macrograph (joined by Hong Kong’s Dif-
ferent Digital Design and Los Angeles-based Moai Films) completed the spectacu-
40lar computer-generated imagery (hereafter CGI). Previously, Macrograph – along
with Moneff, Locus Corp., and Korean VFX firm Venture 3D – had completed the
CGI for the action-packed 3D film Journey to the West: Conquering the Demons
(2013), while at least 11 Korean visual and special effects companies, including
Macrograph, Dexter Digital, Digital Studio 2L, and Digital Idea, worked on the
45collaborative hit The Monkey King (2014). In their respective credits, The Mermaid,
Journey to the West and The Monkey King boast the longest list of Korean compa-
nies and practitioners of any films produced in China, demonstrating the increasing
scope of the continuing internationalization of both Chinese and Korean cinema.
In light of this extensive and expanding list of Chinese–Korean film encounters,
50it came as no surprise when, in July 2014 – the ten-year anniversary of SARFT’s
4 B. Yecies
GCUL 1223643 CE: VK QA: PD
17 August 2016 Coll: QC:Initial
promulgation of The Administration of Sino-Foreign Cooperation in the Production
of Films Provisions – a co-production agreement was signed in Seoul between poli-
cymakers from Korea’s Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism and China’s
SAPPRFT. The announcement of the deal followed a high-profile trade summit in
5 Seoul between Korean president Park Geun-hye and Chinese president Xi Jinping.
Headlines trumpeting the co-production treaty are difficult to find as the signing
was overshadowed by the larger bi-lateral meeting in July 2014 and the subsequent
China–South Korea Free Trade Agreement talks held in Beijing in November 2014.
Suffice it to say that, at the time, leading film trade publications Variety, The Holly-
10 wood Reporter, and Screendaily hailed the treaty as a ‘landmark agreement’.2 How-
ever, in practice the deal is little more than a thinly-veiled device that would enable
Korean films to be classified as ‘domestic’ in China, thereby circumventing China’s
protectionist import quotas.3 Given that other recent studies of film policy (Parc
2016) and cultural diplomacy (Kang 2015) in Korea have neglected to discuss the
15 implications of the agreement, it seems fitting that the present investigation should
attempt to fill the gap.
Like other international policy instruments of its kind that seek to increase train-
ing opportunities – as well as to provide location incentives, producer offsets and
tax exemptions, and post-production rebates – the 2014 agreement undertakes to
20 stimulate an increasing number of official film collaborations and industry network-
ing initiatives between both nations, and to maximize distribution opportunities for
co-produced films in the global market. Under the agreement, a film qualifies as an
official co-production after meeting specific requirements from each partner. Official
co-productions are considered to be ‘domestic’ films in both countries, thus
25 enabling them to circumvent existing film quotas that restrict the number of annual
screenings of imported, foreign films. On paper, the agreement seeks to promote
the development of the Korean and Chinese film industries and to increase the
competitiveness of joint productions by facilitating technical cooperation across all
sectors of the filmmaking process, including visual and special effects, virtual real-
30 ity, and digital cinema infrastructure.
In reality, however, as Korea already has an established record of technical
innovation and a mature film industry ecosystem (see Yecies 2010), the agreement
effectively favors Chinese firms in their bid to catch up with international industry
standards and adopt the genre-bending story lines for which Korean cinema is so
35 well known. More importantly, as the following discussion illustrates, the collabora-
tion process has already achieved a momentum of its own in the absence of any
formal co-production agreement, and it is a moot point whether such agreements
will help or hinder the development of two national film industries which already
have a successful record of leveraging off each other’s particular strengths and defi-
40 ciencies.
The Korean Film Council (hereafter KOFIC) has been instrumental in creating
the atmosphere in which collaborative ventures have flourished. Korean practition-
ers such as Andy Yoon (CEO, Moonwatcher Films) have been developing personal
networks and exploring opportunities for both formal and informal co-productions
45 since 2008 – largely through KOFIC-sponsored events. Yoon is also a KOFIC co-
production mentor (appointed in 2011), leading workshop discussions in annual
industry networking events run in Beijing and Seoul.4 For practitioners such as
Yoon – whose path has crossed the author’s several times since 2008 while con-
ducting research in Korea and China – the excitement and hype surrounding the
International Journal of Cultural Policy 5
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5treaty have been undercut by the length of time it has taken policymakers to pro-
mulgate the formal agreement. Moreover, the content of the agreement appears less
significant than the actual efforts and accomplishments of practitioners forging their
own collaborative relationships with Chinese partners and making other inroads
into the Chinese film industry.
10That being said, China’s co-production treaties require both domestic and inter-
national partners to liaise with SAPPRFT via the China Film Co-production Corpo-
ration (hereafter CFCC), the chief quasi-government body responsible for the
selection and administration of co-produced films. According to most of these
agreements, all international (i.e. non-Chinese) partners are required to fund
15between 20 and 80% of the total production budget. In Britain’s case, representa-
tives from the UK Department for Culture, Media and Sports and/or the CFCC can
negotiate wider financial contributions of between 10 and 90% – to accommodate
additional input from a third co-producing partner that may or may not have an
existing treaty with China. Regardless of the funding ratios agreed on, producers
20are encouraged to match creative contributions to their financial commitment.
Unlike similar treaties between China and Australia, Britain, and New Zealand,
for instance, the text of the China–Korea agreement is shorter and less detailed than
many of its predecessors. It contains 15 articles as well as an explanatory annex
that define subjects covered in the agreement, including: general aims and benefits,
25such as the removal of local market and import barriers; approval processes; cre-
ative contributions from a film’s cast and crew; sharing of computer graphics, vir-
tual reality and/or digital cinema skills and technologies; production budgets and
in-kind costs; and guidelines for contributions made by (minor) third parties.
Whereas China’s treaties with Australia and New Zealand contain similar wording,
30guidelines, and restrictions, its agreement with Korea omits (for example) criteria
relating to the composition of soundtrack music, creating opportunities to include a
wider than normal range of international musicians in a given production.
From the Chinese perspective, co-productions are subject to a lengthy three-
stage approval and completion process, involving extensive paperwork, online sub-
35missions, and other administrative processes. (SAPPRFT now requires project
coordinators to submit all documentation for each stage of a given production
simultaneously via its E-Government Network website (http://dy.chinasarft.gov.cn/)
and also to CFCC – in hard copy.) First, co-producers must receive project and
script approval (a ‘Film Project Establishment Notice’ and ‘Chinese-Foreign Film
40Co-production Permit’), which grants them provisional compliance and authoriza-
tion to shoot the film. Second, they must obtain government consent for the
‘Official Shooting Plan’, which enumerates the specific production details, such as
shooting locations, logistics, and a full list of the cast and crew (including their per-
sonal details and filmographies). Third and finally, producers must seek final
45approval (a ‘Film Review Decision’ and ‘Film Public Screening Permit’) from
SAPPRFT as well as written approval from KOFIC. Additional administrative and
approval processes – prior to SAPPRFT/CFCC approval – are required at the
provincial or municipal level depending on where the Chinese partner is based.
Given this extraordinarily complicated process, it is not surprising that so few pro-
50ducers on both sides have pursued this formal avenue for collaboration.
Although the China–Korea treaty (available at: www.koreanfilm.or.kr/jsp/coPro
duction/treaties.jsp; and www.chinahollywood.org/china-co-production-treaties) sets
out its aims succinctly, the annex to the agreement provides concrete details about
6 B. Yecies
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the application process which are missing from similar treaties, which tend to focus
5 on the mutual benefits to be gained from increasing awareness of each other’s film
industry and respective cultures. However, like most film policy instruments, the
real importance of the agreement lies in the additional momentum it gives to the
shifting of film collaborations away from the ‘offshoring’ or ‘runaway productions’
of the past, to the internationalization that is now an established component of
10 Anglophone film production. In doing so, it also shifts the industry away from a
limited output of state-sponsored propaganda films toward the status of an eco-
nomic commodity augmented by knowledge and technology transfers, as well as
the creative ideas and professional practices contributed by a host of willing collab-
orators from Korea.
15 Despite the best-laid plans of bureaucrats and operatives in both countries, this
continuing shift of money, talent and technological know-how is by no means an
automatic and orderly process. However, after discussing the implications of the
agreement with many Korean and Chinese film industry representatives during mul-
tiple visits to China and Korea, the author believes that the two countries are on
20 the cusp of something that differs radically from the experience of other national
cinemas and some of the particular cultural diversity and theoretical framework set-
tings that have received considerable attention in the past (see, for example, Moran
1996 and Jäckel 2000). More specifically, as the present article demonstrates, the
China–Korea connection remains more robust and enmeshed than China’s links
25 with any of the other countries with which it has a co-production treaty; in late
2015 these included: Australia (2007), Belgium (2012), Britain (2014), Canada
(1987), France (2010), India (2014), Italy (2004), South Korea (2014), Malta
(2015), Netherlands (2015), New Zealand (2010), Singapore (2010), and Spain
(2014). Official co-production (as well as unofficial collaborative) films resulting
30 from these other agreements are few and far between. At the same time, and
despite the doomsaying common in the Chinese press and echoed in a recent China
Daily headline, ‘It’s Hollywood, silly!’5 – a reminder of how Hollywood block-
busters have historically dominated the global box office – the 2014 treaty has cir-
cumvented, or even partly assisted in the transformation of pre-existing tensions
35 between state ideology and official film policy, on the one hand, and a new era of
commercialism in China.
To enable us to look forward and to begin imagining the types of new films
and other forms of collaboration that the 2014 Korea–China co-production agree-
ment will encourage, it may be useful to look back at some of the key films that
40 form the background to this new policy instrument. Among an increasing number
of bilateral film encounters, three films stand out for the lessons that they offer:
Late Autumn (2010), Mr. Go (2013), and Wedding Invitation (2013). Drawing them
into the larger discussion offers an opportunity to underscore some of the tensions
and contradictions inherent in cultural policy change.
45 On the road again
Late Autumn is a Korea–US–Hong Kong co-production remake of Korean director
Lee Man-hee’s legendary 1966 arthouse melodrama of the same title. This road
drama explores the relationship between a man on the run and a female prisoner on
a three-day prison furlough. Predating the 2014 agreement by four years, it is a key
50 co-production that attempted to appeal simultaneously to audiences in Korea, Hong
International Journal of Cultural Policy 7
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Kong, and China. The film was directed and written by Kim Tae-yong of Korean
horror–drama Memento Mori (1999) fame, and produced by seasoned Korean pro-
ducer Lee Joo-ick, whose company, Boram Entertainment, is at the forefront of
Korea’s international co-production scene. Late Autumn was co-produced by Hong
5Kong heavyweights Shi Nansun (former wife of action director Tsui Hark), and
Pang Ho-cheung, along with prominent Korean music director and investor Cho
Sung Woo. The project built on existing relationships that Lee had established with
Chinese partners in his earlier international co-productions, such as Hark’s Seven
Swords (2005), and Chi Leung ‘Jacob’ Cheung’s Battle of the Warriors (2006), and
10was given additional international heft by his casting of leading Chinese actress
Tang Wei and Korean television heart-throb Hyun Bin. An acknowledged heavy-
weight, Late Autumn added substance to bilateral talks about an official co-produc-
tion agreement when the issue first emerged in August 2011.6
While Korean filmmakers are well known for their experimentation with genre,
15Late Autumn returns to classic genre conventions, focusing on a simple story line
featuring an international cast in a story set against the idiosyncratic backdrop of
Seattle, USA. Although one critic panned the film’s ‘clumsy ambition to “interna-
tionalise” South Korean cinema’,7 Late Autumn’s relative commercial success out-
side of Korea points to the domestic industry’s growing expansion in the Chinese
20market, not only giving policymakers a lead in shaping the 2014 co-production
agreement, but also offering encouragement to a string of Chinese road films that
have been shot on locations outside of China and have also benefitted from the
incentives and rebates offered there.
The film follows three days in the life of a Chinese woman, Anna (played by
25Tang Wei, who gained notoriety for her controversial role in Ang Lee’s erotic spy–
thriller Lust, Caution (2007)), who is serving a prison term in California for mur-
dering her husband. During a weekend furlough to attend her mother’s funeral in
Seattle, she meets a young Korean gigolo, Hoon (played by Hyun), who is eluding
the enraged husband of a wealthy Korean client. While it failed at the Korean box
30office, Late Autumn became the highest grossing Korean film released on the Chi-
nese film market, creating a box office record of over $9.5 million US (60 million
RMB) in takings over a two-week period in March 2012.8 This box office perfor-
mance, which brought in almost double its production budget, sent a strong mes-
sage to domestic and international players eyeing the Chinese market: make your
35productions low-budget and set them on the road, where incentives and crews on
location can assist with the production.9
The film cuts between Anna and Hoon ensconced in their separate worlds dur-
ing their stay in Seattle. They soon reunite and explore some of Seattle’s land-
marks, including the farmers market and Lake Union waterfront, at which time
40Anna reveals her life story to Hoon in Chinese. He responds with the occasional
‘hao’ (good) and ‘huai’ (bad) – the only Chinese words he knows. The pair makes
a pact to meet at a particular highway rest stop after Anna is released from prison.
However, Hoon fails to appear on the appointed day.
Was the making of Late Autumn the result of ‘clumsy ambition’ or a calculated
45strategy for survival in a highly competitive industry? Time will tell. However, as a
Korean melodrama-cum-road movie made in the US by local and Hong Kong
crews – an arrangement which enabled it to be released in China as a SARFT-ap-
proved ‘local’ film – Late Autumn replaced the ‘national’ content characteristic of
domestic Korean productions with a strong infusion of ‘transnational’ elements
8 B. Yecies
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5 extending to actors, locations, and dialog. More critical than this transnational mix,
however, was the production strategy that other Chinese filmmakers have quickly
learned from and incorporated into subsequent road pictures, including Lost in
Thailand (2012, shot in Chiang Mai), Up in the Wind (2013, filmed in Nepal), Old
Boys: The Way of the Dragon (2014, filmed in New York), and especially Finding
10 Mr. Right (2013, shot in Vancouver, but set in Seattle and also starring Tang Wei,
who married Kim Tae-yong, the Korean director of Late Autumn). Each of these
transnational initiatives was eligible for policy-based local tax incentives, shooting
rebates, and advance onsite assistance that served as additional lures to the loca-
tions chosen.
15 Size does matter
The sports–fantasy drama Mr. Go (2013) is Korea’s first feature film wholly shot in
3D, and the first commercial 3D film jointly produced by Korea and China – and
one of the first such projects to employ a 3D producer to liaise between crewmem-
bers and camera teams throughout all stages of the workflow process. Inspired by
20 Korean cartoonist Heo Young-man’s comic book The Seventh Team (1984), Mr. Go
anthropomorphizes the life of an aging circus gorilla named Ling-ling (aka Mr. Go)
who has learned Chinese as well as how to play baseball from Wei-wei, a young
female ringmaster (played by Josie Xu, known for her roles in other films featuring
generous use of VFX: CJ7 (2008), Future X-Cops (2010), and Starry Starry Night
25 (2011)). Released simultaneously in both countries only one month after the signing
of a co-production MOU in June 2013, the project played a noteworthy role in
advancing relations between the Chinese and Korean industries. All eyes were on
this VFX-laden blockbuster, which – although the filmmakers may not have real-
ized it at the time – established the critical early groundwork for the Korea–China
30 co-production treaty following the start of talks in August 2011.
In the story Wei-wei inherits the circus after her grandfather dies in the real-life
Sichuan earthquake that occurred in May 2008. To evade her grandfather’s gam-
bling debts (accumulated by betting on Korean baseball games), Wei-wei relocates
the circus troupe to the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, an area inhabited
35 by ethnic Koreans. One day, a cunning recruiter appears, and lures Wei-wei and
Ling-ling to Seoul to play for the real-life Doosan Bears baseball team. The film
focuses on the culture shock experienced by Ling-ling and the Korean Baseball
League following his introduction to the game. Eventually, Wei-wei’s younger and
more aggressive circus gorilla, Letting (aka ‘thunder’), appears as a contender in
40 the same league – brought to Korea by a Chinese gangster determined to collect
Wei-wei’s Chinese debts. Letting’s arrival threatens Mr. Go and his team’s winning
streak, resulting in a final showdown. Yet, Ling-ling prevails and helps the Doosan
Bears win the championship. In the end, the debt collector is deported back to
China for laundering money, and the conniving recruiter is jailed but then released
45 on good behavior. Letting is sent to the Seoul Zoo, and finally Wei-wei and Ling-
ling return to Yanbian to live happily ever after.
Although it failed to exceed box office and audience expectations in both Korea
and China, the story behind Mr. Go’s production and the company behind it – Dex-
ter Studios – are key elements in this evolving policy tale of two filmmaking
50 nations. Mr. Go was directed by Kim Yong-hwa, who had debuted a decade earlier
with the comedy Oh Brothers (2003) before cementing his reputation with the
International Journal of Cultural Policy 9
GCUL 1223643 CE: VK QA: PD
17 August 2016 Coll: QC:Initial
romantic comedy 200 Pounds Beauty (2006) and the sports–drama Take Off (2009)
– both box office hits made with digital special effects created by Korea’s Eon Dig-
ital Film. Mr. Go, for which Kim was also the screenwriter, film editor, and execu-
5tive producer, is Kim’s fourth and most ambitious film to date. It was for this
project, involving a giant gorilla created with 3D and advanced VFX, that Kim
established his own company, Dexter Digital (under Dexter Studios, established in
2007), in 2010 with consulting assistance from Kim Tae-yong, a senior CGI spe-
cialist and animation software developer (2003–2010) for the US VFX firm
10Rhythm and Hues Studios – best known for its cutting-edge work on Ang Lee’s
2012 Oscar-winning Life of Pi.10 Like Eon, Kim aimed to model Dexter on New
Zealand’s venerable Weta Workshop and its digital VFX firm, Weta Digital, seeking
to attract international directors and their effects-heavy blockbusters.11
For both gorillas, Kim sought to create realistic creatures with the type of com-
15plex fur that looks natural to the human eye – developed with a CGI software tool
similar to that used to animate Sulley’s turquoise fur in Pixar’s Monsters, Inc.
(2001), as well as drawing on the hair simulator that Kim Tae-yong developed at
Rhythm and Hues for Garfield (2004), Ring 2 (2004), and The Chronicles of Nar-
nia (2005).12 After approving the prototypes, which Kim developed over 18 months
20with around $1.4 million US raised from Korean government and private investors,
Showbox – one of Korea’s ‘big four’ vertically integrated film investment, produc-
tion and distribution companies – joined the project and gave Mr. Go the green
light for full-scale production. In total, the film spent three-and-a-half years in pro-
duction and cost an estimated $25 million US to make (about one-fifth of Life of
25Pi’s total budget) – around half of which was utilized for the research and develop-
ment of VFX hardware and software through Dexter Digital.
Kim’s personal networks in Korea and China (aided primarily by producer Yi
Chi Yun), enabled him to involve other key players in the Chinese film industry
such as director Feng Xiaogang and Huayi Brothers, one of China’s largest private
30entertainment companies, which became a major investor in Mr. Go. Huayi Broth-
ers were interested in working with Kim following the relative success of his 200
Pounds Beauty at the Chinese box office (generating 2 million Yuan, a healthy sum
at the time). They shared Dexter and Showbox’s vision for pooling financial and
technical expertise and transforming the Mr. Go project into a successful Korea–
35China blockbuster co-production. Huayi Brothers eventually invested around $5
million US, significantly increasing the likelihood that Mr. Go would receive
SAPPRFT censorship approval, as well as a subsequent wide release in China.13
Other crucial financial support was gained from KOFIC’s International Co-produc-
tion Incentive and P&A feature film and animation dubbing schemes, as well as
40KOCCA’s Culture Technology (CT) Research & Development Program. By draw-
ing on this tangible pool of support offered to filmmakers by the Korean govern-
ment, Kim was able to build his company into a cutting-edge Asian and digital
VFX post-production firm in the mold of Peter Jackson’s Weta Workshop.
Although completed Korea–China collaborations such as Mr. Go may not have
45been celebrated – or even explicitly acknowledged – during the signing of the
2014 bilateral co-production agreement, the film is nevertheless significant because
the project brought the two industries into a more intimate relationship than many
insiders could have imagined at the time. That connection was further strengthened
when real estate giant and (now) international multiplex cinema chain Wanda
50Media purchased a $10 million US stake (13.3%) in Dexter Digital in April
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2015.14 To further leverage Dexter’s offerings in China, Legend Capital – the chief
shareholder of Lenovo computers, and a substantial Chinese venture capital firm in
its own right – also invested $10 million US (13.3%) in Dexter Studios in July
2015.15 And, given Late Autumn’s success in China, and Lee Joo-ick’s international
5 experience, it is unsurprising that Lee is now a major producer with Dexter China,
Dexter Studio’s China outpost.
As a result of this cultural policy-driven venture, Showbox and Huayi Brothers
are currently planning a slate of co-productions – the result of their own inter-com-
pany film cooperation agreement signed in early 2015 – which will continue to
10 transform the ever-expanding commercial face of Chinese cinema. Dexter’s experi-
enced 3D and post-production staff will no doubt play a key role in the pre-visual-
ization and early camera-planning stages of these films, as they did for previous
large-scale films produced by Huayi Brothers such as Journey to the West and The
Taking of Tiger Mountain.
15 Remade in China
Finally, key actors such as CJ E&M – the leading member of the ‘big four’ verti-
cally integrated corporate players in the Korean film industry (along with Showbox,
Lotte Cinema, and N.E.W.) – have been contributing to the bilateral relationship
through films such as A Wedding Invitation (2013). This romantic melodrama piv-
20 ots around high-school sweethearts who break up to pursue their dream careers.
Before saying goodbye, the couple decides to reunite five years later – that is, if
they are still unattached. Upon the proposed reunion date, Qiaoqiao (played by Bai
Baihe) has achieved fame as a designer in Shanghai, while Li Xing (played by
Eddie Peng) has realized his dream of becoming a famous chef in Beijing. In a
25 twist, Li Xing reveals his commitment of marrying another woman, giving Qiao-
qiao two weeks to change his mind. After Qiaoqiao succeeds in her quest, the
career-oriented couple make a new pact to marry each other in another five years if
both are still unwed. When that time comes, however, a further obstacle arises and
the drama continues.
30 CJ E&M managed this project in conjunction with Chinese companies CFG
and C2M, employing a more hands-on approach than they had used for their first
co-production with China, Sophie’s Revenge in 2009 (which earned approximately
$15 million US – double its production budget – in China).16 A Wedding Invitation
was directed by established Korean director Oh Gi-hwan and, although it employed
35 an all-Chinese cast, the core creative and production staff – including the director,
cinematographer, editor, and production designer – were almost all Korean. Loosely
based on Oh’s 2001 hit The Last Present, the screenplay for A Wedding Invitation
was rewritten and thus localized to fit a contemporary Chinese context. And this
time, it worked. Although the film underperformed in Korea, the box office takings
40 in China more than compensated for it, garnering $31 million US in April 2013
and making it the highest grossing Korea–China co-production at the time.17 As a
result of its success in the Chinese market, and given that it was released prior to
the signing of the official 2014 agreement, A Wedding Invitation (2013) has become
a model for other filmmakers to emulate – with or without assistance from their
45 governments.
Beyond the guidelines offered by any policy agreement, the development and
production strategies adopted by CJ E&M since 2009 have minimized the
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cross-cultural, communication, and practical clashes that occur when mixing crews
of different nationalities and making films for simultaneous appeal to audiences in
5multiple countries. Although most practitioners who had creative input into A Wed-
ding Invitation in the planning stages were Korean, the scriptwriter and leading
actors were all ethnic Chinese, including Taiwanese–Canadian actor Eddie Peng
and Chinese actress Bai Baihe. During the pre-planning stages, CJ E&M content
developers conducted detailed research on Chinese audiences to learn more about
10their tastes in films – an everyday practice in Hollywood, but a relatively new mar-
keting strategy for the Chinese film industry.
The joint project provided CJ E&M with an opportunity to localize a universal
story – never an easy task. As those familiar with Mr. Go (and Chinese culture)
will know, its baseball-centric theme underwhelmed Chinese audiences simply
15because baseball is not a popular sport in China. As a result of its marketing
efforts, A Wedding Invitation has secured a reputation as one of the first Korea–
China co-productions to customize a story that appeals specifically to Chinese audi-
ences and the sentiments that underpin their culture – data researched at a granular
level (Ma 2013). This collaborative film encounter not only struck a chord with
20Chinese audiences (evidenced by its box office performance), but its production
approach pushed the bilateral relationship beyond the conventional strategy of
importing stars and/or locations as ‘exotic’ accessories into an otherwise wholly
domestic film. In these ways, A Wedding Invitation has done more for the future of
co-productions than any single film policy or incentive could ever achieve.
25Two years on, the production context of A Wedding Invitation still offers an
ideal model for Korean–Chinese co-productions. The producer’s brief is a simple
one: find a good story (one that has already proven itself with Korean audiences),
and then revise it with assistance from a Chinese screenwriter who understands
Chinese culture and society. Remove all specifically Korean content from the origi-
30nal film, and then employ experienced filmmakers (who may or may not be Korean
nationals) to make the film for a Chinese audience. This formula has become the
key to success for Korean filmmakers wanting to break into the China market, as
well as for Chinese filmmakers and firms aiming to leverage the creativity and
technical knowhow for which Korean cinema – in the post-censorship (i.e. post-
351996) era – is highly regarded around the world.
This tried-and-true approach to co-productions has continued throughout 2014
and 2016, and embraces remakes of older romances and rom-coms as well as new
releases, including Dancing Princess (2005), Cyrano Agency (2010), Architecture
101 (2012), Marriage Blue (2013), and Miss Granny (2014), which have all proved
40especially popular with Chinese audiences. When 20 Once Again (2015), a local-
ized version of Miss Granny co-produced by CJ E&M and Beijing Century Media,
was released in China in early 2015, it generated $59 million US, making it the
highest-earning Korea–China co-production to date and placing it firmly among
China’s top ten (at number 9) highest grossing romantic comedies ever.18 The origi-
45nal story’s concern with family relationships, romantic love and nostalgia for lost
youth, and the basic plot dealing with a woman in her 70s who is magically trans-
formed into a 20-year-old girl, were all retained, but the original script was modi-
fied to suit the socio-cultural tastes of Chinese audiences. In a canny move, the
filmmakers cast Lu Han – a former member of the immensely popular pan-Asian
50boy band EXO – as a rock musician, putting 20 Once Again on the radar of the
huge numbers of EXO and other K-pop fans in China. This comic fantasy family
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drama was directed by Leste Chen, one of the hottest young Taiwanese directors in
China – already well known for directing the mystery–thriller The Great Hypnotist
(2014) – thus increasing the film’s potential appeal at home and abroad.
5 Conclusion: whither film policy?
The Korea–China film collaborations discussed in this article have unfolded on
multiple levels, bringing together creative talent involving producers, directors, and
actors as well as action, visual effects, and post-production specialists and cine-
matographers on an unprecedented scale. These bilateral film encounters have
10 occurred largely without any intervention or guidance from official co-production
policy agreements and, as a result, have fallen outside of the aims and objectives
of a formal policy instrument. The 2014 co-production treaty has thus been estab-
lished over the top of this critical foundation formed by a wealth of previous film-
making activity. As this study has shown, the long-term success of any film policy
15 instrument requires far more than words on paper – challenging cultural policy
scholars and critics to situate the case studies presented here within existing theoret-
ical frameworks.
The opportunities for Korean film practitioners to work on the long list of Chi-
nese films discussed here and elsewhere (see Yecies and Shim 2016) have grown
20 from tiny seedlings – the contacts and friendships that a handful of aspiring Korean
filmmakers made while studying at the Beijing Film Academy during the early-to-
mid-1990s. The professional inroads made by these now major players have
enabled themselves and others throughout the Korean film industry to become some
of the most active practitioners and companies in China today. In this way, Chinese
25 cinema is continuing to expand, leveraging off talent and expertise from some of
its Asian neighbors without relying solely on bureaucratic policy agreements to
facilitate the acquisition of privileged insights into a partnering country’s market
and the sharing of advanced creative ideas and technical expertise. In the case of
Korea and China, these things have long been happening on their own.
30 Nearly all of the pre-2014 films discussed above have involved informal or
unofficial agreements and collaborative initiatives rather than a predetermined set of
government regulations. The filmmakers have ‘made do’ by forging company-to-
company deals via informal personal networks, allowing the parties involved to
benefit from their existing access to different types of market channels. In following
35 this path, these and other bilateral film projects have created stronger bonds
between the two industries, particularly with respect to resisting the US dominance
of the film and cultural industries while also fostering dialogue, promoting network-
ing opportunities, and informing future policy development in the Asian region.
While, on paper, the Korea–China agreement promises to provide deep and
40 privileged access to their respective markets, in reality, the hard work has only just
begun. As we have seen, the quest for the consummate project and the advanced
communication and technical skills required to complete it is driving corporate
investors to showcase elements of local cultural identity from within China’s cre-
ative industries. Nevertheless, the official 2014 agreement may not be as much of a
45 ‘landmark’ as trade articles suggest – nor its goals of improving economic and cul-
tural relations between the two nations, and potentially increasing awareness of
each other’s film industry and respective cultures. The China–South Korea FTA is
likely to prove far more pertinent to this end. Thus, the most effective method of
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developing a collaborative film project still seems to be the exploitation of personal
5networks.
In today’s China, the economic benefits of engaging in co-productions seem
more crucial than pursuing a collaborative cultural experience – not because of the
opportunity to compound funding sources promised by co-production policies, but
rather to enable Chinese producers and large firms to make bigger and more techni-
10cally savvy feature films that transcend the types of production made under the
aegis of the state-controlled industry prior to CEPA. Moreover, the ‘national’ status
achieved by a formal international co-production is the most desirable outcome, as
it provides unprecedented access to domestic markets and overseas audiences that
might otherwise be restricted by local censorship and import regulations. On top of
15this, genre choices are changing and expanding in China – thanks in part to the
technical expertise and creative nous of the Korean firms and practitioners that have
been working in China and/or with Chinese partners during the past decade. In
these ways, Chinese films are beginning to show an increasing ability to compete
with better-funded US productions and also the novel genres for which Korean cin-
20ema is known. At the same time, Chinese companies are benefitting progressively
from their investments in the US and Korean markets.
This being said, there are still obstacles to overcome. For some producers and
filmmakers who are used to working solely with their own nationals, international
co-production agreements are impractical for a variety of reasons: they are too com-
25plex; they threaten other incentives available in a partnering country; producers
have difficulties negotiating the divergent requirements of two or more partnering
governments; crews from different cultures and language backgrounds are usually
challenging to manage; and negotiating complex legal agreements increases overall
costs. Nevertheless, despite these challenges, the geographic and cultural proximity
30of China and Korea and their minor time zone difference encourage working
together. More importantly, catering to only one nation’s audience at a time – as in
the case of A Wedding Invitation discussed above – increases the all-important local
identity factor without alienating international audiences and sacrificing costs.
Now that the bilateral agreement has been signed, the co-production treaty is
35expected to provide new opportunities for a large tranche of both industries – for
all of the abovementioned reasons. Nevertheless, many of the industry players from
both countries that I’ve talked with over the last 36 months actually see the 2013
MOU and 2014 agreement as a hindrance to bilateral development and collegiality
– precisely because of the bureaucratic threats that formal policy implementation
40pose. In addition, the economic benefits of pooled resources and reduced costs –
estimated to be a fraction of producing films in the US – can quickly evaporate
because of divergences between local and foreign production methods. On the
ground and in their own way, Chinese filmmakers are a talented and experienced
bunch. However, production crews on both sides of this agreement still have a lot
45to learn about each other’s local customs and traditional operating methods. In
other words, appropriate expectations and reasonable targets, achievable through
industry experience and personal networks, are needed for international collabora-
tions to succeed – especially given the Chinese and Korean governments’ divergent
approaches to censorship and media regulation more generally.
50Nevertheless, for the remainder of the 2010s, the situation looks like a win–win
scenario for both countries. Korean practitioners have contributed to the expansion
of Chinese cinema in terms of the refinement of genres, themes and story lines, as
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well as technical skills, and Chinese film companies have enabled Korean cinema
to increasingly internationalize its approach to overseas markets. In other words,
5 Chinese cinema is well on the way to fully embracing a new chapter of transna-
tional cinema in both the economic and cultural sense. In these ways, both Korean
and Chinese national cinemas are undergoing a major makeover as Chinese film-
makers and firms leverage the innovative esthetic qualities and export-oriented
expertise for which Korean cinema has become celebrated around the globe since
10 the censorship of domestic films was ended in 1996. In this new cultural and com-
mercial arena, Korea’s global experience and success with its own brand of style
and technical prowess has been instrumental in developing its collaborative rela-
tionship with China.
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Notes
1. Insightful studies of the Korean wave (aka Hallyu) include Chua and Iwabuchi 2008,
and Kim 2013.
30 2. See: China and South Korea Sign Co-Production and Import Deal Patrick Frater; and
Clifford Coonan, South Korea, China Sign Landmark Co-Production Pact (3 July
2014); and Noh, J. 2014. Screen daily (4 July 2014). Korea, China sign co-pro agree-
ment. Available from: http://www.screendaily.com/news/korea-china-sign-co-pro-agree
ment/5073840.article.
35 3. In 2016, China’s quota of foreign films includes 34 revenue-sharing films per year,
while Korea’s screen quota regime requires all cinemas to show domestic films for a
minimum of 73 days per annum.
4. At the time of writing, Moonwatcher is co-producing Legend Heroes, an animated chil-
dren’s TV series, and Fly, Superboard, a feature animation for theatrical release – both
40 of which combine CGI technology and expertise from Korea and investment from
China Film Group.
5. Fan, Xu. ‘It’s Hollywood, silly!’ China daily (9 July 2015). Available from: http://usa.
chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-07/09/content_21230399.htm.
6. Noh, J. 2013. ‘South Korea and China sign tentative co-production pact’, Screen daily,
45 18 June, http://www.screendaily.com/news/south-korea-china-sign-tentative-co-pro-pact/
5057476.article [Accessed 2 July 2015].
7. Elley, Derek. ‘Late Autumn’ Film Business Asia (21 October 2010). Available from:
www.filmbiz.asia/reviews/late-autumn [Accessed 3 February 2014].
8. Hwang, Hei-rim. ‘Late autumn becomes the all-time highest grossing Korean film in
50 China.’ Korean cinema today (13 April 2012), Available from: http://koreanfilm.or.kr/
AQ2
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webzine/sub/news.jsp?mode=A_VIEW&wbSeq=106#sthash.jd8Q5pw2.dpuf [Accessed
6 April 2015].
9. While shooting in Seattle with local crews and equipment hire, Late Autumn’s produc-
ers qualified for a 30% tax rebate through the Washington Motion Picture Production
5Incentive Program. Available from: http://washingtonfilmworks.org/funding/production-
incentive-program.
10. Not to be confused with the Korean film director of Late Autumn, Kim Tae-yong, who
is married to Tang Wei.
11. See KIM Su-yeon. ‘Visual Effect Creators/Dreaming of Another WETA/EON DIGI-
10TAL FILM.’ 1 November 2009. Available from: http://koreanfilm.or.kr/jsp/news/re
ports.jsp?blbdComCd=601008&seq=127&mode=VIEW.
12. See Kim Tae-yong’s home page. Available from: https://sites.google.com/site/taey
ongkimshomepage/ [Accessed 14 May 2015]. Drawing on technical input from Kim
Tae-yong, Dexter has also developed a water software tool that was utilized in the
15VFX for Chinese blockbusters The Taking of Tiger Mountain (2014) and Monkey King
(2014).
13. Ma, Kevin. 7 October 2013. ‘Korean cinema, Chinese characteristics.’ Film Business
Asia, Available from: http://www.filmbiz.asia/news/korean-cinema-chinese-characteris
tics [Accessed 22 July 2014].
2014. See Kil, Sonia. 3 April 2015. ‘China’s Wanda Takes $10 Million Stake in Korean
VFXHouse Dexter.’ Available from: http://variety.com/2015/biz/asia/chinas-wanda-
takes-10-million-stake-in-korean-vfx-house-dexter-1201465914/ [Accessed 23 July
2015].
15. Frater, Patrick. ‘China’s Legend Capital Invests in Korean VFX Firm Dexter Studios’
25Variety 21 July 2015. Available from: http://variety.com/2015/biz/asia/legend-capital-in
vests-in-dexter-studios-vfx-1201544591/.
16. Sophie’s Revenge, CJ E&M’s first co-production after establishing a Beijing office in
2009, involved actor So Ji-seop and several Korean crewmembers: colorists Lee Yong-
gi and Ethan Park (from HFR), and sound engineer Kim Seok-won (from Bluecap
30Soundworks). Although it was a box office success in China, some Korean critics
panned the film for aping the conventions of Korean romantic dramas. See Lee, Hyo-
won. ‘Sophie’s Revenge’ Satisfies to a Point.’ The Korea times (20 August 2009).
Available from: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/art/2009/08/135_50426.html
[Accessed 2 March 2015].
3517. Bingbin, Han. ‘A Touch of Seoul in Chinese Films.’ China daily USA (11 December
2014). Available from: http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-12/11/con
tent_19066937.htm [Accessed on 11 February 2015].
18. Hendriks, Priscilla. ‘“20, Once Again!” Tops Charts.’ On Screen Asia (11 February
2015). Available from: http://www.onscreenasia.com/article/20-once-again-tops-charts/
4016657 [Accessed 6 March 2015].
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